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Abstract 
This paper examines how investment, the military burden, and military expenditures as a share of 
the central government budget have affected economic growth for a sample of developing 
countries in the 1980s. Factor analysis and discriminant analysis are used to separate the 
countries into two samples. The model which we estimate indicates that defense expenditures 
differ among groups of countries as to how these expenditures affect growth. In the group of 
countries which are relatively militarized, growth is independent of the defense burden. For the 
low militarized group it appears that the higher the defense burden the higher the growth. For a 
few countries within this group, increased shares of the central budget allocated to defense seems 
to spur growth. 
1 Introduction 
Real world military expenditures declined from US$ 1.21 trillion in 1987 to $1.0 
trillion in 1991 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1994). Although 
the decline was not so marked for the developing countries (DCs) as a whole, in the 
majority of DCs real military expenditures declined between 1990 and 1991. In 
terms of regional military expenditures, the only region to report an increase 
between 1990 and 1991 was the Middle East. Even within the region however, there 
was a great diversity: between 1987 and 1991 half the countries increased defense 
spending (Kuwait's average growth was 100%) and the other half cut defense 
expenditures. More than likely, these diverse trends are likely to countinue in the 
near future. Depending on the relative impact of defense spending, ·shifts in 
resources to and from defense programs are likely to have significant impacts (both 
1 An earlier version of this paper was given at the International Conference on Business and 
Economic Development in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Countries, Malta, May 1992. 
The views expressed in this note are not necessarily those of the US Government or the Naval 
Postgraduate School. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft. 
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positive and negative) on economic performance and democratization. The 
purpose of this note is to examine how shifts in military expenditures are likely to 
affect economic growth in DCs. 
We employ factor and discriminant analysis to divide the sample of DCs into 
two groups (high and low militarization). A model of economic growth is 
estimated using regression analysis to examine the effects of militarization on 
economic growth. 
2 Methodology 
There are four commonly used measures of relative defense effort: (a) defense 
expenditures as a share of Gross National Product (GNP), the "defense burden," 
(b) defense expenditures as a share of the central government budget, ( c) armed 
forces per capita, and (d) arms imports as a percent of total imports. While these 
measures roughly divide the developing countries into two groups, the classifi-
cation is often ambiguous. Morocco for example has a relatively low military 
burden (approximately six percent) but at the same time over a fifth of the 
central budget is allocated to defense. Factor analysis can resolve the classifi-
cation issue to identify the main trends in militarization. The relative scores on 
each factor provides a means of unambiguously ranking countries in terms of 
their defense patterns. 2 The military variables noted above for 1972-79 and 
1980-89 and twenty-one other independent variables reflecting economic per-
formance, debt and structural parameters were included in the factor analysis to 
see if military variables were systematically associated with standard economic 
indices.3 
The final pattern4 identified five major factors of militarization: (1) debt and 
arms imports, (2) economic growth, (3) general public spending and debt, (4) 
defense spending, and (5) debt servicing. Arms imports were more highly 
correlated with the patterns of debt and exports (factor 1) than with actual defense 
expenditure ratios. The military dimension (factor 4) indicated that countries with 
relatively high shares of defense expenditures in the central government budget 
2 For a general survey of this method see Rummel (1970). While the results of the factor analysis, 
the factor scores, the discriminant analysis scores, and most of the regression analysis results are 
not reported in this note, they can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
3 The initial sample of 98 countries chosen for the factor analysis were those classified by the 
World Bank (1991) as non-high income. Due to missing observations, the sample set was 
subsequently reduced to 62 countries. Economi~ variables were also taken from World Bank 
(1991) and several earlier issues. 
4 Several preliminary runs suggested that armed forces per capita did not add significantly to the 
factor patterns and was thus dropped from the analysis. Factors were selected on the basis of 
their Eigen Value being greater than two. 
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also experienced high military burdens - the share of defense in the GNP. The 
country scores on each of the five factors have a mean of zero with a score above 
zero indicating a higher than average rate for that particular factor. The sample set 
was split into two groups (above and below zero) and a discriminant analysis (using 
the same set of independent variables as in the factor analysis) calculated the 
probability of correct placement in each group. 
The majority of countries were correctly classified (probability of 0.90 or 
higher). Four countries were incorrectly classified. Congo and Algeria were moved 
from the low to the high militarization group and Nigeria and Portugal were placed 
from the high to the low militarization group. As expected, the first discriminating 
variables introduced into the program were military related - the military burden, 
the military share of the budget, and arms imports as a percent of total imports. 
However as the program attempted to delineate the two groups, arms import 
variables were replaced by economic variables. 
The two groups of countries (high and low militarization) formed by the 
discriminant analysis differed in a number of ways: 
l. As expected, the high group had larger levels of defense as part of the budget 
and GNP, and also in terms of arms imports. 
2. The high group generally experienced more rapid rates of growth, although 
the low group had a larger investment growth rate in the 1970s. Part of the 
faster growth in the high group can be attributed to superior export growth 
and the resulting ability to sustain import growth. Government consumption 
was approximately the same for both groups in the 1980s although slightly 
larger for the high group in the 1970s. 
3. Not surprisingly the high group enjoyed a greater share of resources devoted 
to savings and investment, with the low group devoting a larger porportion of 
resources claimed by government consumption. Exports accounted for the 
about the same share of GNP in both groups. 
4. Finally, the high group had a slightly larger debt to export ratios although 
their debt to GNP ratio was similar to the low group by 1989. 
The picture which emerges from these comparisons is one whereby the high defense 
group appears to be more economically dynamic - rates of growth are higher, as 
are investment and savings rates, together with similar debt servicing burdens. 
However this does not imply that this group of countries spends more on defense 
because they can afford the necessary allocation of resources to defense. It suggests 
that these countries have been able to sustain relatively high rates of economic 
expansion despite relatively high defense bu~dens. 
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3 Budgetary Tradeoff s - Cross Section Results 
To examine the impact of defense expenditures, a linear model of economic growth 
between 1980 and 1989 was estimated in the following form: 
GY =a+ bGI + cGYL + dMEY + eMEGE + fMEGEL + E (1) 
where GY is the 1980-89 rate of growth of GNP, GI is the 1980-89 rate of growth in 
investment, GYL is the 1970-79 rate of growth in GNP, MEY is the average share 
of defense expenditures in GNP between 1980 and 1989, MEGE and MEGEL is the 
share of defense expenditures in the central government budget for 1980-89 and 
1972-79, respectively, and E represents the error term with the traditional statistical 
assumptions. The coefficients are represented by b, c, d, e, and f; the expected sign 
of the coefficient b and c are expected to be positive; the coefficients for the three 
military variables cannot a priori be predicted. This type of model which we have 
used elsewhere (Looney and Frederiksen, 1986) assumes that investment is a key 
element in economic growth (see Faini, Annez, and Taylor, 1984) and draws from 
an empirical pattern noted by Nugent (1977) " ... for the aggregate growth rates of 
individual countries to be rather similar from one decade to the next." In 
explaining the role of momentum in the growth process, Nugent suggested that 
many of the stabilizing and growth equating mechanisms assumed for the 
developed countries were often inaccurate in developing countries. Specifically he 
suggested that (a) the nature of technological selection and change, (b) the process 
of capital formation, and (c) the way in which human capital and income 
distribution tends to vary with growth as the primary reasons why disequilibrium 
tends to be more prevalent in developing countries (see Looney and Frederiksen, 
1988). Past growth in GNP (GYL) was included in the model to control for the 
apparent existence of this phenomena in the two sample groups of countries. 
The military burden (MEY) has been included in a number of studies (Benoit, 
1983 for example) to account for the impact of defense expenditures on growth. 
While the assumed impact is often negative, several studies (Frederiksen and 
Looney, 1983, and Looney, 1988) have found sub-groupings of countries where the 
military burden has been positively associated with growth. The last two terms 
(MEGE and MEG EL) reflect the budgetary effects of defense expenditures after 
investment, momentum and the military burden have been controlled for. Thus, 
the possible impact of growth of defense funds preempting funds which might have 
been used in other economic or capital building programs is accounted for. 
Equation ( 1) was initially estimated using linear regression analysis for the 
entire set of countries as follows: 5 
5 ** indicates statistical significance of the estimated coefficient at the 95 % level of confidence or 
higher. Standardized coefficient are reported. 
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GY = 0.64 IG + 0.32 GYL + 0.38 MEY - 0.18 MEGE + 0.07 MEG EL; (2) 
(7.48)** (3.70)** (2.93)** (-1.63) (0.46) 
R2 (adj.)= 0.67; F = 21.21; dof = 48 
The results indicate a consistency with the pattern which emerged from the 
discriminant analysis. Specifically, investment was the most important factor 
affecting economic growth during the 1980s; momentum from earlier growth 
(GYL) was also statistically significant with countries tending to maintain growth 
patterns from one decade to the next. The estimated coefficient for the military 
burden was positive and statistically significant indicating that countries with 
relatively high defense burdens also experienced the most rapid rate of growth. 
Lastly the estimated coefficients for the budgetary variables do not appear to be 
statistically significant for developing countries as a whole after accounting for 
investment, earlier growth momentum, and the defense burden. 
Two additional sets of regression equations were estimated in an attempt to 
identify any trends as the sample set of countries gradually became more 
militarized. As before, the discriminant scores were used to split the sample into 
two groups (below zero and above zero).6 Initially, equation (1) was estimated for 
countries with a discriminant score greater than -2.5. Next equation (1) was 
estimated for countries whose discriminant score was greater than - 2.0. This 
process was repeated (by increments of 0.5). At each step, the remaining group was 
"more militarized." Thus we can see whether, on the one hand, the general patterns 
identified for the entire sample (equation (2)) can be generalized for individual sub-
groupings, or whether on the other hand the variables affecting economic growth 
change as the sample set becomes more militarized. 
The results produced several interesting patterns. Because only a few 
countries had discrimimant scores smaller than - 2.5, the initial regression (n = 51) 
was very similar to that reported above as equation (2). As more and more of the 
least militarized countries were excluded, the importance of both the military 
burden variable and the momentum variable in contributing to economic growth 
declined - eventually the coefficient lost its statistical significance. In other words, 
for the high militarization group, military expenditures (as a percent of GNP) was 
not an important determinant of economic growth. Concomitantly, military 
expenditures as a percent of the central budget (MEGE) became statistically 
significant but with a negative sign for the estimated coefficient. When the model 
was estimated by incrementally excluding the high militarized countries, the 
coefficient for MEGE became positive and statistically different from zero at the 
95 % and above level. 
6 The discriminant scores ranged from - 5.35 for Lesotho (least militarized) to 17. 78 for Syria. 
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4 Conclusions 
Two major conclusions have resulted from our analysis. First, developing 
countries are not homogeneous in the way defense expenditures impact economic 
growth. By and large, this supports much of·the earlier research in this area. 
Countries with high defense scores (defined as a discriminant score greater than 
zero) appear to enjoy strong growth independent of the defense burden. Our results 
suggest these countries may experience a negative impact on growth from relatively 
high budgetary shares allocated to the defense sector. Second, it appears that 
countries with a low defense score tend to grow very little. Within the group, the 
higher the defense burden the higher the economic growth. For the few countries 
with extremely low defense scores, increased shares of the central budget allocated 
to defense seems to have a positive effect on growth. 
While the patterns are fairly clear, their explanation is not. While it is tempting 
to argue that "defense makes sense" based on our results for the entire group, it is 
clear that the positive connection holds true only for specific and well defined sub-
groups. It may be that high defense group is experiencing diminishing returns from 
defense while the low defense group has not yet reached this point. This type of 
explanation may be extended in terms of the military's share of the budget: while 
countries with a high proportion allocated to defense may have enjoyed some 
stimulus in the short-run, over time the deterioration in economic services and 
human capital may have offset any positive effects. As defense budgets decline, 
hopefully further research will throw additional light on the critical issue on the 
relationship between defense and growth. 
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